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Recently, there have been numerous advances in modelling optimal international
portfolio allocations in macroeconomic models. A major focus of this literature has
been on the role of currency movements in determining portfolio returns that may
hedge various macroeconomic shocks. However, there is little empirical evidence on the
foreign currency exposures that are embedded in international balance sheets. Using
a new database, we provide stylized facts concerning the cross-country and time-series
variation in aggregate foreign currency exposure and its various subcomponents. In
panel estimation, we ￿nd that richer, more open economies take longer foreign-currency
positions. In addition, we ￿nd that an increase in the propensity for a currency to
depreciate during bad times is associated with a longer position in foreign currencies,
providing a hedge against domestic output ￿ uctuations. We view these new stylized
facts as informative in their own right and also potentially useful to the burgeoning
theoretical literature on the macroeconomics of international portfolios.
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The continuing expansion of gross cross-border investment positions has stimulated a new
wave of interest in the international balance sheet implications of currency movements.
These exchange rate based valuation e⁄ects depend crucially on the currency composition
of international portfolios. At the same time, recent advances in macroeconomic theory
have provided a more nuanced consideration of the general equilibrium characteristics of
the portfolio allocation problem than was attained in the earlier wave of ￿portfolio balance￿
models (see, amongst others, Devereux and Sutherland 2006, Tille and van Wincoop 2007
and Engel and Matsumoto 2008). A major concern of this new research programme has
been to identify the role of currency movements in the design of optimal portfolios.
However, this literature has been constrained by a lack of empirical evidence concerning
the currency exposures that are present in the international balance sheet. In recent work
(Lane and Shambaugh 2007), we have compiled and described the currency composition
of foreign asset and liability positions for a broad set of countries over 1990-2004. In that
work, we established that the currency pro￿les of international portfolios show tremendous
variation, both across countries and over time.
Accordingly, our goal in this paper is to synthesize two recent advances in the literature
￿ the expansion of knowledge concerning the data on the currency composition of cross-
border portfolios and the advances in theory regarding those positions ￿ to study the
determinants of the cross-country and cross-time variation in foreign currency exposure.1
We pursue two broad lines of analysis. First, we provide a decomposition of aggregate
foreign currency exposure into its constituent elements. This is important, since much of
the theoretical literature has focused on particular dimensions of foreign-currency exposure,
whereas the valuation impact of currency movements depends on the aggregate net foreign
currency position. Second, we conduct a panel analysis of variation in foreign currency
exposure in order to identify which country characteristics help to explain the cross-sectional
and time-series variation in the level of foreign currency exposure.
In the decomposition, we divide aggregate foreign-currency exposure into two primary
subcomponents: the net foreign asset position and the level of foreign currency exposure
embedded in a zero net foreign asset position. While some models focus on the latter
component, the data suggest that the net foreign asset position is the most important
1We are interested in economy-wide exposure measures, as captured by the international investment
position. There is also an extensive literature on measuring currency exposure at the ￿rm level (see, for
example, Adler and Dumas 1984 and Tesar and Dominguez 2006).
1determinant of aggregate foreign currency exposure. In addition, the decomposition shows
that the structure of foreign liabilities (across portfolio equity, direct investment, local-
currency debt and foreign-currency debt) is a key determinant of foreign currency exposure,
with the equity share in liabilities more important than the currency composition of foreign
debt liabilities. These ￿ndings point to the importance of analyzing the mix of liabilities
and not focusing on one type within a model.
We next analyze the panel variation in foreign currency exposures. We ￿nd that factors
such as trade openness and the level of development help to explain the cross-sectional
variation in foreign currency exposure: richer, more open economies take longer positions
in foreign currency. Once the cross-sectional variation is eliminated by including a set
of country ￿xed e⁄ects in the estimation, we ￿nd support for a key general prediction
of the theoretical literature: an increase in the propensity for a currency to depreciate
during bad times is associated with a longer position in foreign currencies, which acts
as a hedge against domestic output ￿ uctuations. Our ￿nal contribution is to show that
there is substantial heterogeneity in the roles of each regressor in explaining the variation
in individual subcomponents of foreign-currency exposure: accordingly, it is important to
take a broad perspective rather than examining individual components in isolation.
Our work is related to several previous empirical contributions. In relation to develop-
ing countries, the closest is Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2005) who compiled data
on the currency composition of the external debts of developing countries. However, our
approach is more general in that we calculate the currency composition of the entire interna-
tional balance sheet. As such, we go beyond Goldstein and Turner (2004) who extended the
empirical approach of Eichengreen et al by constructing estimates of net foreign-currency
debt assets for a selected group of countries but did not incorporate the portfolio equity
and FDI components of the international balance sheet. For the advanced economies, Tille
(2003) calculates the foreign currency composition of the international balance sheet of the
United States, while Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) calculate dollar exposures for a large
number of European countries, plus Japan and China. Relative to these contributions, we
provide greatly-expanded coverage for a large number of countries and estimate the full
currency composition of the international balance sheet.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out the conceptual
framework for the study, while Section 3 brie￿ y describes our dataset. Stylized facts are
presented in Section 4, with the main empirical analysis reported in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
22 Conceptual Framework
2.1 Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Portfolio Returns
The role played by nominal exchange rate ￿ uctuations in determining the payo⁄s to cross-
border holdings and the pattern of international risk sharing has long been recognised in
the literature (see, amongst others, Helpman and Razin 1982, Persson and Svensson 1989,
Svensson 1989, Neumeyer 1998 and Kim 2002). Most recently, the new macro-￿nance
literature in which cross-border portfolio positions are endogenously determined has also
emphasised the potential role played by nominal assets and liabilities in contributing to
international risk sharing.
The mechanism varies across models. For instance, Devereux and Saito (2006) con-
sider a single-good ￿ exible-price world economy in which home and foreign countries are
subject to shocks to endowments and in￿ ation. If it is assumed that the covariance between
productivity and in￿ ation is negative (as is empirically the case), a striking result is that
complete risk sharing can be achieved if asset trade is restricted to home and foreign nom-
inal bonds. Since the return on nominal bonds is procyclical in this setting, risk sharing is
accomplished by the home country taking a long position in the foreign currency bond and
a short position in the domestic currency bond ￿ the portfolio payo⁄ will be high when
the home endowment is low.
A similar result is obtained by Devereux and Sutherland (2006a) who consider inde-
pendent shocks to endowments and money stocks. In their symmetric model, the share











M are the variances of the endowment and money shocks, ￿ is the discount
factor and ￿Y is the autoregressive parameter for the endowment shock. Accordingly, the
long position in foreign currency (and short position in domestic currency) is increasing in
the relative importance of endowment shocks versus monetary shocks and also increasing in
the persistence of the endowment shock. The intuition is that nominal bonds are better able
to deliver risk sharing, the less important are monetary shocks (Kim 2002 also makes this
point). Moreover, the importance of risk sharing (and hence the gross scale of positions) is
increasing in the volatility and persistence of endowment shocks.
An alternative account is provided by Engel and Matsumoto (2008) who provide an
illustrative model featuring a one-period horizon, sticky prices and home bias in consump-
3tion. Sticky prices mean that hedging nominal exchange rate movements o⁄ers protection
against shifts in the real exchange rate and the terms of trade and a simple foreign-exchange
forward position (achievable through holding a long-short portfolio in foreign-currency and
domestic-currency bonds) can deliver full risk sharing, making trade in equities redundant.2
In their baseline model, a portfolio position that delivers a payo⁄ that is proportional to
the nominal exchange rate achieves full risk sharing, where the elasticity of the payo⁄ to
the nominal exchange rate is








[1 ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿)] + (1 + ￿)(! ￿ 1)b
￿
(2)
where xt denotes the portfolio payo⁄, st is the domestic-currency price of foreign currency,
￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, (1+￿)=2 is the share of home goods in nominal
expenditure, b is the degree of pass through and ! is the elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods.
Devereux and Sutherland (2007) consider a world economy, in which there is a limited
substitutability between home and foreign goods, with shocks to productivity and money
stocks. There is endogenous production of varieties of the goods and prices are sticky in the
format of Calvo-style contracts. In contrast to the other papers, a monetary policy rule is
speci￿ed that adjusts the interest rate in response to in￿ ation. (In this setting, a positive
domestic productivity shock causes a nominal exchange rate depreciation - accordingly, the
optimal hedge is for the home country to hold a long position in the domestic-currency bond
and a short position in the foreign-currency bond.) In the case where only nominal bonds
are traded, the authors show that a monetary policy of strict price stability eliminates the
in￿ uence of monetary shocks on bond returns and hence allows bond portfolios to fully
deliver risk sharing (whether prices are sticky or ￿ exible).
The overall message from this line of research is that a portfolio exhibiting exposure
to nominal exchange rate movements can play a role in contributing to international risk
sharing. A country will wish to go long on foreign currency and short on domestic currency
if the value of the domestic currency positively co-moves with domestic wealth. Moreover,
nominal currency positions are more useful, the less volatile are monetary shocks. Finally,
the gross scale of positions is increasing in the importance of sharing risk - that is, the more
volatile and persistent are wealth shocks.
2In an in￿nite horizon model with price adjustment, these authors show that trade in equities is also
required to deliver full risk sharing. However, even in that case, only limited equity trade may be required
in view of the stabilizing properties of foreign-currency hedges.
42.2 Moving from Theory to Empirics
















it is the share of foreign assets denominated in foreign currencies, and !L
it is de￿ned
analogously. FXAGG lies in the range (￿1;1) where the lower bound corresponds to a
country that has no foreign-currency assets and all its foreign liabilities are denominated in
foreign currencies, while the upper bound is hit by a country that has only foreign-currency
assets and no foreign-currency liabilities. Accordingly, FXAGG captures the sensitivity of
a country￿ s portfolio to a uniform currency movement by which the home currency moves
proportionally against all foreign currencies. This measure explicitly examines the ￿nancial
or balance sheet currency exposure; the real side impact of currency movements on trade
￿ ows is not considered here.
In developing an empirical speci￿cation, it is desirable to encapsulate the main hypothe-
ses generated by the theoretical literature. Accordingly, for empirical purposes, the desired
net foreign-currency exposure of country i￿ s balance sheet may be expressed as:
FXAGG￿
it = ￿ + ￿ ￿ OPENit + ￿ ￿ V OL(Zit) + ￿ ￿ COV (Zit;Eit) (4)
￿’H ￿ V OL(￿it) ￿ ’F ￿ V OL(Eit) ￿ ’F ￿ V OL(￿Fit) + "it
where OPENi is trade openness, Zi is the vector of ￿ wealth risk factors,￿Ei is the nominal
exchange rate, ￿i is domestic in￿ ation and ￿F is foreign in￿ ation. Trade openness is included
because the value of foreign assets in a portfolio is increasing in a country￿ s propensity to
consume imports (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄2001). In relation to the latter three terms, nominal
volatility at home limits the ability of domestic residents to issue domestic-currency assets
to foreign investors, while nominal volatility overseas reduces the willingness of domestic
investors to hold foreign-currency bonds.
However, a host of factors may inhibit a country￿ s ability to attain its desired net foreign-
currency position. The capacity to issue domestic-currency liabilities (whether domestic-
currency debt or equity instruments) is limited by a poor-quality domestic institutional
environment, especially in relation to the treatment of foreign investors. On the other side,
the ability to acquire foreign-currency assets may be limited by capital controls, regulatory
prohibitions on institutional investors, or simply the wealth of the country. Accordingly,
the observed foreign-currency exposure may be characterized by
5FXAGG
it = FXAGG￿
it ￿ C(Fit) (5)
where Fi denotes the set of proxies for the limits on the capacity to issue domestic-currency
liabilities and acquire foreign-currency assets.
This allows us to write an empirical speci￿cation
FXAGG
it = ￿ + ￿ ￿ TRADEit + ￿ ￿ V OL(Zit) + ￿ ￿ COV (Zit;Eit) (6)
￿’H ￿ V OL(￿it) ￿ ’F ￿ V OL(￿Fit) ￿ ￿’F ￿ V OL(Eit) ￿ ￿ ￿ Fit + "it
2.3 Components of the Net Foreign Currency Asset Position






















This expression shows that FXAGG is the sum of the net foreign asset position plus the share
of foreign liabilities which are in local currency minus the share of foreign assets which are in
local currency. Accordingly, if all assets and liabilities are in foreign currency, the aggregate
foreign-currency exposure is simply the scaled net foreign asset position. Conversely, if the
net foreign asset position is zero, aggregate foreign-currency exposure is the di⁄erence in
the foreign-currency share between the asset and liability sides of the international balance
sheet. Accordingly, we label this second part of the equation FX
AGG;0











where NFAit is the net foreign asset position (scaled by A + L) and FX
AGG;0
it is the
aggregate foreign currency exposure evaluated at a zero net foreign asset position. This
decomposition is useful, since much of the theoretical literature has focused on scenarios in
which the net foreign asset position in zero, even if non-zero net foreign asset positions are
empirically important in determining aggregate foreign currency exposures.





























6That is, FXAGG decomposes into two elements of the net foreign asset position (non-
reserve net foreign assets ANR￿L, plus foreign-exchange reserves FXR) and three elements
of FXAGG;0 ( portfolio equity and direct investment foreign liabilities, plus domestic-
currency debt liabilities minus local-currency debt assets), where all terms are scaled
to A+L. This decomposition has several appealing features. First, it clearly di⁄erentiates
between the relative contributions of foreign-exchange reserves and non-reserve components
in the overall net foreign asset position. Second, it highlights that FX
AGG;0
it is driven by
three separate factors: all else equal, a greater share of equities in foreign liabilities reduces
reliance on foreign-currency ￿nancing, while the foreign-currency position is more positive,
the greater is the share of domestic currency in foreign debt liabilities and the smaller is
the share of domestic-currency assets in non-reserve foreign assets.3 In our empirical work,
we examine each of these elements in some detail, since diverse strands of the existing the-
oretical and empirical literatures have typically focused on individual elements rather than
the aggregate position.
Lane and Shambaugh (2007) show that the quantitative impact of a uniform currency
movement is product of FXAGG and the gross scale of the international balance sheet
NETFX = FXAGG ￿ IFI (10)
where IFI = A + L is the outstanding gross stock of foreign assets and foreign liabilities.
We will examine NETFX in addition to FXAGG and its subcomponents in our empirical
analysis.
Finally, we also construct an alternative measure of foreign-currency exposure that only
takes into account debt assets and liabilities. While we view the aggregate position as the
most comprehensive and useful, some models have speci￿c predictions for the debt-only










where PDEBT and ODEBT denote portfolio and non-portfolio (￿other￿ ) debt respec-
tively. The net foreign currency position in the debt portion of the balance sheet is scaled
to the size of the debt balance sheet, the debt assets plus debt liabilities.
3The domestic-currency share in non-reserve foreign assets will typically be driven by the domestic-
currency share in non-reserve foreign debt assets. The exception are those countries that share a currency
with other countries, such that a proportion of foreign equity assets will be denominated in domestic currency.
73 Data
The construction of the dataset is described in detail in Lane and Shambaugh (2007).
Since the focus in this paper is on aggregate foreign-currency exposure, our focus here
is on describing our approach to estimating the foreign-currency and domestic-currency
components of foreign assets and foreign liabilities. Since, for this purpose, we do not
depend on the composition of the foreign-currency component across di⁄erent currencies,
the calculations here are less taxing than the bilateral currency estimates reported by Lane
and Shambaugh (2007).
In relation to foreign assets, foreign-exchange reserves are by de￿nition denominated
in foreign currencies. For the portfolio equity and direct investment categories, we make
the assumption that an equity position in destination country j carries an exposure to the
currency of country j. In e⁄ect, this assumption implies that the home-currency returns on
foreign equity assets can be analyzed as consisting of two components: the foreign-currency
return, plus the exchange rate shift between the foreign and home currencies. So long as the
two components are not perfectly negatively correlated, the home-currency return will be
in￿ uenced by currency movements such that the equity category indeed carries a currency
exposure.
The portfolio debt category poses the most severe challenge since many countries issue
debt in multiple currencies, while the propensity to purchase bonds issued in particular
currencies varies across investors of di⁄erent nationalities. We make extensive use of the
international securities dataset maintained by the BIS, which reports the currency denom-
ination of international bonds for 113 issuing countries.4 For some countries (such as the
United States), international bonds are issued mainly in domestic currency; for other coun-
tries, international bonds are typically denominated in foreign currency.
In order to allow for the propensity of investors to buy international bonds that are
denominated in their own currency, we exploit the data provided by the United States
Treasury, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan regarding the currency com-
position of the foreign assets of these regions. The United States reports the currency
4Where the BIS data set lacks data on the currency of issue for a country, we rely on the World Bank￿ s
Global Financial Development database of the currency composition of external debt. This is an imperfect
measure because it includes non portfolio long term debt (such as bank loans), but the countries which
are missing BIS data make up a small fraction of internationally held debt assets. Our dataset focuses on
international bond issues - while foreign investors have become active in the domestic bonds markets of
developing countries in very recent years, the international bond issues are more important for the vast bulk
of our sample period.
8denomination of its portfolio debt assets in each destination country (US Treasury 2004).
From the Bank of Japan data, it is clear that Japanese investors purchase (virtually) all
of the yen-denominated debt issued by other countries, while the European Central Bank
data suggests that investors from the euro area hold 66 percent of the euro-denominated
debt issued by other countries (European Central Bank 2005).5 Accordingly, we adjust the
currency weights derived from the BIS data to take into account the portfolio choices by
the investors from the major currency blocs and employ these adjusted weights in working
out the currency composition of the foreign holdings of investors from other countries.6
This procedure delivers estimates of the foreign- and domestic-currency components of the
foreign portfolio debt assets held by each country (in addition to details on the composition
of the foreign-currency component). Finally, in relation to non-portfolio debt assets, we
are able to exploit the BIS locational banking statistics to obtain a breakdown between
home-currency and foreign-currency bank assets.
The treatment of foreign liabilities is largely symmetric. Portfolio equity and direct
investment liabilities are assumed to be in the home currency, while the BIS databanks
on bank debt liabilities and securities issuance allows us to obtain a breakdown of debt
liabilities between the domestic currency and foreign currency components. (For developing
countries, we use the World Bank￿ s Global Development Finance database to obtain the
currency breakdown of external debt.)
As discussed in Lane and Shambaugh (2007), it is possible that some exposure is hedged
using derivatives. It is important to note that any within country derivative sales are moot
as they simply shift exposure across parties within the country￿ s overall balance sheet. Also,
anecdotal evidence and some country studies suggest cross border hedging is not on the
same scale as the asset and liability positions we examine.
Finally, Lane and Shambaugh (2007) show that that valuation e⁄ects that we derive
from the ￿nancially-weighted exchange rate indices are strong predictors of actual valuation
e⁄ects, suggesting our measures are good approximations of actual positions.
Our full sample of countries includes 117 countries where we have full data. We eliminate
hyperin￿ ation episodes due to their status as outliers, and start a country￿ s data after
the conclusion of a hyperin￿ ation (countries with hyperin￿ ations late in the sample are
5Bank of Japan data show the currency composition and amount of Japanese foreign long-term debt
assets. When compared with the BIS currency denomination issuance data set, we see that e⁄ectively all
yen-denominated debt issued outside Japan is held by Japanese investors.
6That is, if US, European, and Japanese investors all hold debt in Brazil and Brazil issues debt in local
currency, dollars, euro, and yen, then the US investor most likely holds dollar debt, the Japanese investor
most likely holds more yen debt and the European investor most likely holds more euro debt.
9dropped). Many results examine the variation between 1994 to 2004 (1996 to 2004 in the
regression analysis). These results use a smaller 102 country sample that has full data from
1994 through 2004.7
4 Foreign-Currency Exposure: Stylized Facts
Table 1 shows some summary statistics for FXAGG, NETFX and FXDEBTAGG for
di⁄erent country groups for 1994 and 2004. The data show a general move towards a more
positive FXAGG position between 1994 and 2004. Table 1 also shows considerable cross-
group variation. For each period, FXAGG is more positive for the typical advanced economy
relative to the typical emerging market economy, while the typical developing country has
a negative FXAGG position. These patterns also broadly apply in relation to NETFX but
the long position of the typical advanced economy is ampli￿ed by the much higher level of
international ￿nancial integration for this group than for the lower-income groups.
To put these ￿gures in context, a negative NETFX value of minus 22 percent (the
typical developing country) means that a uniform 20 percent depreciation against other
currencies generates a valuation loss of 4:4 percent of GDP, while the same currency move-
ment generates a 7:2 percent of GDP valuation gain for a country with a positive NETFX
value of 36 percent (the typical advanced economy). These wealth e⁄ects are considerable
and demonstrate why the aggregate foreign-currency position against the rest of the world
is an important indicator.
Table 1 also shows positions for FXDEBTAGG. First, we note the mechanical pattern
that debt-only positions are automatically more negative than overall positions. Since FDI
and portfolio equity liabilities are in local currency and foreign equity assets are in foreign
currency, equity positions on either side of the balance sheet makes FXAGG more positive.
Hence, FXDEBTAGG is more negative than the overall FXAGG in all years. A somewhat
surprising result is that even advanced countries in 2004 have negative FXDEBTAGG
positions. This occurs because so many of their assets are either in local-currency debt
7The remaining data comes from standard sources. Exchange rate and in￿ ation data are from the
International Monetary Fund￿ s International Financial Statistics database, while GDP and trade data are
from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators database, and the institutional data comes from
the World Bank￿ s Worldwide Governance Indicators database (www.govindicators.org). The peg variable is
from Shambaugh (2004), capital controls data come from di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2008) and is a binary
variable summarizing information from the IMF yearbooks (using the alternative indicators developed by
Chinn and Ito (2007) or Edwards (2007) makes nearly no di⁄erence and the choice is based on maximising
data availability).
10assets or equity assets, even though they have few foreign currency debt liabilities, the net
currency position in foreign bonds is negative.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the cross-country distribution of FXAGG and its
various subcomponents (plus NETFX) for 2004 (the ￿nal year in the dataset). Across
the full sample, the average country has a roughly-balanced foreign-currency position, but
the range extends from minus 72 percent to plus 68 percent. It is important to note that
a positive value of FXAGG is not in itself good or bad. Instead, the optimal allocation
could depend on the factors noted above. While having a negative FXAGG means losses
on the balance sheet if there is a depreciation, it conversely means gains in the case of an
appreciation.8 The typical net foreign asset position is negative, on the order of 30 percent
of assets and liabilities, while the FX
AGG;0
it terms tends to partly balance this out, since it
is typically positive.9
As for the subcomponents, the non-reserve component of the net foreign asset position
of most countries is negative but, by de￿nition, foreign-exchange reserves are always at
least slightly positive. Portfolio equity and direct investment are on average about 20
percent of liabilities, giving most countries a built-in set of domestic-currency liabilities.
Many countries have no domestic- currency foreign debt liabilities, and even more have
no domestic-currency foreign assets.10 Finally, NETFX is a more skewed variable with a
much larger standard deviation as some countries have very large ratios of foreign assets
and liabilities to GDP.
We can re-organize the decomposition of FXAGG into a series of bivariate decompo-
sitions. At the upper level, we decompose FXAGG between NFA (scaled by A + L) and
FXAGG;0. In turn, we decompose the overall net foreign asset position between non-
reserve net foreign assets and foreign-exchange reserves and FX
AGG;0
it between the eq-
uity share in foreign liabilities and the domestic currency share term (DCSHARE =
DEBTLDC ￿ ADC
NR). Finally, the DCSHARE term can be disaggregated into its two
constituent parts.
8Lane and Shambaugh (2007) provide an extensive discussion of the distribution and trends in this
particular statistic. For context, a negative position of -0.5 suggests that for every 10 percent depreciation
of the currency, the country will face valuation losses of 5 percent times the assets plus liabilities divided by
GDP. For the typical country, this would mean a loss of 10 percent of GDP.
9To exhibit a negative value of FX
AGG;zero
it would require more foreign assets in local currency than
foreign liabilities. Since most countries have some local currency liabilities (due to direct investment and
portfolio equity) and few countries have local currency foreign assets, only two countries actually have a
negative value of FX
AGG;zero
it .
10The latter is expressed as a negative number, since it enters the decomposition negatively.
11In order to assess the relative contributions of each term in a bivariate decomposition,
we report three statistics. Taking the generic pair Q = N1 + N2, we generate: (i) the
R2 from a regression of Q on N1; (ii) the R2 from a regression of Q on N2; and (iii)
￿(N1;N2) = Correl(N 1;N2). The pooled estimates are reported in Table 3, while Figures
1-5 show the distributions of these statistics from country-by-country estimation.
Unless the correlation between N1 and N2 is zero, we cannot make a pure decomposi-
tion of the variance of Q into the part driven by N1 and the part driven by N2 (because
V AR(Q) = V AR(N1) + V AR(N2) + 2COV (N1;N2)).
In some cases, researchers look at variance ratios and arbitrarily allocate the covariance
term, frequently just splitting it in half. If the covariance term is zero, the R2 in our bivariate
regression simply equals the variance ratio because the estimated coe¢ cient (beta) on N1
would be equal to 1 and the R2 = ￿2V AR(N1)=V AR(Q). If the covariance is positive,
the beta is biased upwards and is greater than one in both regressions. In these cases we
are e⁄ectively allocating the covariance to both variables. Alternatively, if the covariance
is negative, beta is biased towards zero and our R2 will be lower than a variance ratio.
A disadvantage of using simple ratios of variances is that if the correlation of N1 and N2
approaches negative 1, the variance of Q can approach zero, in which case the ratio of the
variance of either variable to the variance of Q will approach in￿nity.
No technique can purely separate what is driving Q in such a decomposition, but the
technique we follow has the advantage of being bounded between (0;1). In the case where
the two components are positively correlated, we are saying that either one could be ex-
plaining the movement in Q and if they are negatively correlated, we are saying that neither
explains it particularly well since they cancel one another out.
Figure 1 shows the country-by-country decomposition of FXAGG between NFA and
FX
AGG;0
it . It shows that both factors independently have high explanatory power for most
countries but with the net foreign asset position typically having the higher bivariate R2. In
terms of comovement, the sample is evenly split between cases where the net foreign asset
position and FXAGG;0 are positively correlated and those where the correlation is negative.
In the pooled regressions in Table 3, net foreign assets are much more important, with the
R2 from a regression of FXAGG on FXAGG;0 typically close to zero, with the exception of
the emerging market group.
Figure 2 decomposes the net foreign asset position between the non-reserve net foreign
asset position and foreign-exchange reserves. The former is clearly the dominant factor.
Within countries, a regression of the aggregate net foreign asset position on the non-reserve
net foreign asset position has an R2 close to unity for nearly all countries, while at least half
12the sample has an R2 less than 0:5 when the regressor is the level of foreign-exchange re-
serves. Again, the split between positive and negative correlations between the two elements
is relatively balanced, but is 60-40 in favor of positive cases.
The pooled regressions in Table 3 emphatically reinforce this point. In the full sample
and all subsamples, the R2 when the non￿ reserve net foreign asset position is the regressor
is at least 0:9 and the only subsample where reserves appear important is the developing
world. Table 3 shows a negative correlation of reserves and non-reserve NFA in advanced
countries suggesting that reserves could be held as a hedge against losses in the non-reserve
balance sheet, but there is no correlation in the emerging countries and developing countries
actually show a positive correlation. This implies that countries with a positive NFA hold
more reserves, suggesting they are not a hedge of private positions in poor countries.
Figure 3 powerfully shows that the equity share in liabilities is far more important
than the currency composition of debt assets and liabilities in driving the behaviour of
FX
AGG;0
it . Especially in non-advanced countries, there is simply far more variation in the
importance of FDI and portfolio equity liabilities than in domestic-currency foreign debt
liabilities (which is relatively low) or domestic-currency foreign assets (which are almost
always zero), meaning that FXAGG;0 will be almost entirely determined by the extent of
portfolio equity and direct investment liabilities. In terms of comovements, it is interesting
that there is a 60-40 balance in favor of negative cases. In turn, Figure 4 shows the relative
contributions of the liability and asset sides to the currency composition factor and shows
that the liability side has slightly more explanatory power. The correlation is 80-20 in favor
of negative cases as countries with large domestic-currency debt liabilities also have large
domestic-currency non-reserve foreign assets.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the decomposition of NETFX between FXAGG and IFI.11 It
is interesting that FXAGG has relatively more explanatory power than IFI: the overall
net currency exposure of the economy is driven more by the currency exposure of the
international balance sheet than by the gross scale of asset and liability positions relative
to the economy. There is a reasonably even split between positive and negative correlations
(60￿40 in favor of positive). In Table 3, we see that FXAGG is more important than IFI in
the full pooled sample, but their relative importance varies across the various subsamples.
Our analysis is static in nature, looking at exposure to a change in the exchange rate
based on holdings at a given point in time. One may worry that a collapsing currency (or
fears of one) could lead to a collapsing position if a country is suddenly forced to borrow
11This decomposition is of a slightly di⁄erent nature in that NETFX is the product of FX
AGG and IFI,
whereas each of the other decompositions is of a sum.
13extensively in foreign currency. This might mean that apparently safe positions are illusory.
In fact, a change in the exchange rate typically has little impact on FXAGG. Consider a
country with no assets and all foreign currency liabilities. If the exchange rate depreciates,
they face valuation losses but FXAGG is ￿1 throughout. If assets equaled half of liabilities
and FXAGG is ￿0:5, the same applies. Only if there is an extensive amount of domestic
currency liabilities on the balance sheet can a depreciation shift FXAGG to a more negative
position (by increasing the relative size of the foreign currency liabilities). In fact there is
only a slight decrease in FXAGG in the year prior to a sudden stop and FXAGG on average
does not change at all in the year of a sudden stop.12 Thus we do not view this concern as
particularly problematic, and instead see our measure as a good indicator of the external
balance sheet exposure of countries.
5 Econometric Analysis
5.1 Regression Speci￿cation
We begin our analysis with the determinants of aggregate foreign currency exposure, before
moving on to the subcomponents. Table 4 explores a variety of speci￿cations to explain
variation in FXagg.
We adopt a panel framework
Yit = ￿ + ￿t + ￿
0
Xit + "it (12)
where t = 1996;2000; 2004. We consider four speci￿cations for X. The baseline speci-
￿cation follows the setup described in equation (4) above, which focuses on the types of
variables that are identi￿ed as potentially important in a ￿ friction free￿environment. We
include the following variables
￿ Trade Openness (trade to GDP ratio)
￿ Volatility of real GDP per capita
￿ Covariance of real per capita GDP and the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate
￿ Volatility of the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate
12Thailand and Korea in 1997 do show declining FX
AGG, but the decline is small and is balanced by
countries that show and increasing FX
AGG (perhaps due to being forced to pay back foreign loans when
funding dries up).
14￿ Volatility of domestic in￿ ation
The volatility and covariance measures are calculated for the log changes of each variable
over a rolling 15 year window (since the real variables are only available on an annual basis
for many countries). As was discussed in Section 2.3, the importance of hedging is increasing
in the volatility of domestic wealth (proxied here by GDP per capita). A critical factor
in determining whether FXAGG should be long or short is the sign of the covariance term
between domestic wealth and the nominal exchange rate, proxied here by the the covariance
between GDP and the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate. The more volatile is the nominal
exchange rate, the more risky are foreign-currency assets while domestic in￿ ation volatility
increases uncertainty about the real returns on nominal positions. Finally, a time ￿xed
e⁄ect is included in equation (12) to control for global factors, such as time-variation in the
volatility of global in￿ ation.
We also consider an expanded speci￿cation that seeks to take into account institutional
and policy factors that may alter the desired optimal net foreign currency position and/or
restrict a country￿ s ability to attain its desired level. These variables include:
￿ Institutional Quality
￿ Capital Controls
￿ The de facto exchange rate regime
￿ A marker for being in EMU
A third set of variables is also considered that are viewed as general control variables
￿ GDP per capita
￿ Country size (Population)
The level of GDP per capita is included, since many of the characteristics listed above
are plausibly correlated with the level of development and we want to be able to ascer-
tain whether these variables have explanatory power even holding ￿xed GDP per capita.
Country size is a second general control variable, since previous empirical evidence sug-
gests that larger countries are better able to issue domestic-currency liabilities (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti 2000, Eichengreen et al 2003).
15The regressions use data from 1996, 2000, and 2004.13 We begin by reporting the results
from pooled estimation of the baseline speci￿cation in column (1) of Table 4; we add the
institutional and policy variables in column (2); while we alternatively add the general
control variables in column (3); the full set of regressors are included in column (4). In
order to isolate the time-series variation in the date, we add country ￿xed e⁄ects in columns
(5) and (6); as an alternative (albeit with a drop in the degrees of freedom), we estimate
a ￿ long￿￿rst-di⁄erences equation columns (7) and (8) which examines the changes in the
variables between 1996 and 2004.
It is worth noting that while we present evidence for the full sample of countries, the
results are strikingly similar even if exclude the set of advanced economies. We explicitly
control for EMU, GDP per capita and use country ￿xed e⁄ects in some speci￿cations. These
techniques appear su¢ cient to take into account di⁄erences across the advanced, emerging,
and developing samples.
5.2 Results for FXAGG
5.2.1 Pooled Estimation
Table 4 provides the results. In the pooled estimation with year e⁄ects (the ￿rst four
columns), we see that greater trade openness is clearly associated with a more positive
value of FXAGG: this is true whether more extensive controls are present or not, although
the estimated coe¢ cient drops in value once additional controls are included in columns
(2)-(4). A positive association between trade openness and foreign currency exposure is
consistent with the notion that the role of foreign assets in portfolios is more important,
the greater is the share of imports in domestic consumption (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ 2001).
In relation to the other variables in the baseline speci￿cation, the estimated coe¢ cients
vary in signi￿cance and sign across columns (1)-(4). In terms of signi￿cant results, the
volatility of the nominal exchange rate has the expected negative sign in column (1), while
the volatility of domestic in￿ ation is negative and signi￿cant in columns (3)-(4). The
volatility of GDP is signi￿cant only in column (4) but with a positive sign. Finally, the
covariance of output and the nominal exchange rate enters with a negative sign in column
(4). Accordingly, the results from the pooled estimation do not provide very stable evidence
in terms of the relation between the various volatility indicators and the level of foreign-
13The World Bank governance data are only available in even years and our data is full for many countries
only starting in 1996. We opt to leave 4 year breaks rather than use every year because of the serial correlation
of some variables and because of the overlapping nature of the 15 year windows.
16currency exposure.
Turning to the institutional and policy variables, the results in column (2) indicate that a
better institutional environment is associated with a more positive value for FXAGG, while
the estimated coe¢ cient on the exchange rate peg is signi￿cantly negative - however, neither
capital controls nor the EMU dummy is signi￿cant in column (2).14 However, the inclusion
of GDP per capita as a control in column (4) alters these results: the only policy variable
that is signi￿cant is the EMU dummy which enters with a signi￿cantly negative coe¢ cient.
Rather, the evidence from columns (3) and (4) is that FXAGG is highly correlated with
the level of development: richer countries have a more positive level of foreign-currency
exposure. We surmise that the ability to issue domestic-currency liabilities and obtain
foreign-currency assets is increasing in institutional dimensions that are highly correlated
with the level of development. Finally, the estimated coe¢ cient on country size in columns
(3) and (4) is positive but not quite signi￿cant.
To obtain a perspective on the quantitative importance of the coe¢ cients, we can con-
sider the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients on trade openness, GDP per capita and the EMU
dummy in column (4). In relation to trade openness, the standard deviation in the sample
is 0.47, such that that a one standard deviation in trade openness would generate a move
of 0.03 in FXAGG. The standard deviation of the natural log of GDP per capita in the
sample is 1.6, thus the coe¢ cient on this variable implies a one standard deviation move
implies a move of 0.21 in FXAGG, a very substantial shift. The EMU indicator is a dummy,
thus being in EMU suggests an FXagg which is 0.14 lower than for other countries, which
again is a non-trivial magnitude.
5.2.2 Time Series Variation
The time series variation in the data is captured in the regressions reported in columns
(5)-(8) of Table 4. The advantage to holding ￿xed the cross-sectional variation in the data
is that there may be non-observed country characteristics that in￿ uence the cross-country
distribution of FXAGG values and reduce our ability to accurately capture the impact of
some of our variables of interest; the drawback is that other variables in our speci￿cation
mostly show cross-sectional variation with little time-series variations and these regressors
will play less role in explaining intra-country variation.
14In this speci￿cation, the EMU dummy re￿ ects any extra impact of EMU beyond its stabilising impact
on the nominal e⁄ective exchange rate, which is captured by the PEG variable. It turns out that the pattern
that EMU has led to a less positive foreign-currency position for euro area countries has been well timed,
in that the euro has appreciated against other currencies.
17In the time series dimension, we see several new results. The most striking ￿nding
is that, once either country ￿xed e⁄ects are included or the data are di⁄erenced across
time, the covariance term now exhibits the expected positive coe¢ cient. Holding ￿xed
other factors, the value of FXAGG becomes more positive for those countries that have
experienced an increase in the covariance between domestic output growth and the nominal
exchange rate.
This result is not simply driven by a few countries. Figure 6 shows the partial scatter
of changes in FXAGG against changes in the covariance of the exchange rate and GDP. We
see a clear pattern where those countries with increasingly positive covariance take a more
positive FXAGG position. Returning to the size of the e⁄ect, a one standard deviation
move in the size of the change in the covariance term is 0.005. This implies a one standard
deviation shift in the change in the covariance term would come with an increase of 0.035
in FXAGG.
Conversely, the trade openness result is not signi￿cant and GDP per capita weakens
along the time series dimension: it is clear that these variables help to explain the cross-
country variation in the data but are less useful in understanding shifts over time in the
value of FXAGG. In contrast, population growth now shows up as an important variable.
The logic is twofold. Controlling for GDP per capita, a growing population suggests an
economy that is growing larger. Thus, when an economy grows larger, there is a more
positive FXAGG. If we instead include population and GDP directly, however, population
is still positive and signi￿cant, suggesting the demographics themselves may matter directly.
The global shift to more positive FXAGG positions documented in Lane and Shambaugh
(2007) can be seen in the positive year dummies for 2000 and 2004 (1996 is the excluded
dummy) in columns (1) through (5). Once we consider all controls and include country ￿xed
e⁄ects in column (6), the year dummies are no longer signi￿cant: the regressors explain a
substantial component of the shift to a more positive FXAGG position. We also note that
the EMU dummy is negative and signi￿cant along the time series dimension, such that the
euro area countries clearly shifted towards a more negative position upon the formation of
the currency union.
5.3 Results for FXDEBTAGG
We have repeated similar regressions for the debt-only measure of exposure, FXDEBTAGG.
Table 5 reproduces the speci￿cations in columns (1), (6) and (8) from Table 4 but with
FXDEBTAGG as the dependent variable. The results are nearly identical to those for the
18overall measure. Without country ￿xed e⁄ects, trade openness and GDP per capita are
positive and signi￿cant (with nearly the same magnitude). The only substantial di⁄erence
is that the EMU dummy is cut in half and no longer signi￿cant. With the inclusion of
country ￿xed e⁄ects, the covariance term is still positive and signi￿cant, and is in fact
slightly larger. The variance of the exchange rate is negative and population is positive and
signi￿cant and again the EMU dummy has a slightly smaller size, though in this case it is
still statistically signi￿cant. Looking at the changes speci￿cation, the regressions for the
debt measure show coe¢ cients with a similar direction but larger size and signi￿cance.
5.4 Results for Subcomponents and NETFX
We can learn more about the mechanisms behind both the cross-country and time-series
variation in the data by examining the various subcomponents of FXAGG; in addition, it
is useful to also examine whether the results for FXAGG carry over to NETFX. The
limitation to this exercise is that the strong patterns of co-variation across the di⁄erent
subcomponents that were identi￿ed in Section 3 mean that results for FXAGG may not be
easily attributed to the individual subcomponents. For simplicity, we adopt a symmetric
approach, whereby we maintain the same set of regressors for each subcomponent of FXAGG
and NETFX.
To conserve space, we focus on the most general speci￿cation which includes the full set
of regressors. We report the pooled estimates in Table 6, while the ￿xed-e⁄ects results are
contained in Table 7. To assist in comparing results, column (1) in Table 6 repeats column
(4) from Table 4, while column (1) in Table 7 repeats column (6) from Table 4.
In relation to the pooled estimates in Table 6, a series of interesting observations arise.
In relation to the two primary subcomponents of FXAGG, the positive e⁄ect of GDP per
capita is clearly operating via the net foreign asset position; in contrast, the EMU dummy
a⁄ects the FXAGG;0 term. At a lower level of decomposition, GDP per capita a⁄ects the
non-reserve net foreign asset position; in addition, it is associated with higher values for the
domestic-currency share of debt liabilities and the domestic-currency share of foreign assets.
The EMU dummy has a similar relation with the domestic-currency share of debt liabilities
and the domestic-currency share of foreign assets; EMU membership is also associated with
a reduction in the level of reserves and a decline in the equity share of liabilities, with both
of these e⁄ects acting to reduce FXAGG.
The other variables that are individually signi￿cant in column (1) ￿ trade openness,
the volatility of GDP and the covariance term ￿ are not individually signi￿cant for either
19the net foreign asset position or FXAGG;0. However, at a lower level of decomposition,
we see that trade openness raises the equity share in foreign liabilities but reduces the
domestic-currency share in foreign debt liabilities, which act in opposite directions.15 The
volatility of GDP is only signi￿cant in raising the domestic-currency share of non-reserve
foreign assets. An increase in the covariance between GDP and the nominal exchange rate
is associated with a decline in the non-reserve net foreign asset position, a reduction in
the domestic-currency share of foreign debt liabilities and the domestic-currency share of
non-reserve foreign assets, all of which are consistent with the overall positive coe¢ cient on
the covariance term in the FXAGG regression in column (1).
The main impact of the institutional/policy variables is seen in columns (7) and (8),
which show that capital controls are associated with a reduction in the domestic-currency
share of foreign debt liabilities and the domestic-currency share of non-reserve foreign assets,
while an exchange rate peg raises the domestic-currency share in foreign debt liabilities.
Larger countries have more positive non-reserve net foreign asset positions and a higher
domestic-currency share in foreign debt liabilities and non-reserve foreign assets. Finally,
the pattern that country size is positively associated with a higher domestic-currency share
in foreign debt liabilities is consistent with the evidence of Eichengreen et al (2005), who
￿nd that original sin is more prevalent for smaller countries.
Turning to the ￿xed-e⁄ects estimates in Table 7, the signi￿cantly positive association
between the covariance term and FXAGG in column (1) cannot be traced to individual
components in columns (2)-(8): although it carries the expected sign for each component
(with the exception of the domestic-currency share in non-reserve foreign assets), none of
these e⁄ects are individually signi￿cant.16 In results not reported, we also ran the ￿rst-
di⁄erence speci￿cation as in column (8) of Table 4 and found that the covariance term has
a positive coe¢ cient in regressions for both the net foreign asset position and FXAGG;0 but
it is larger and statistically signi￿cant in the latter case.
In contrast, the volatility of the nominal exchange rate ￿ which is signi￿cantly negative
in column (1) ￿ also shows up as individually signi￿cant with a negative sign in the
regressions for FXAGG;0 and the equity share in foreign liabilities. The pattern for the
EMU dummy is very similar to the pooled estimates, with the exception that it is not
15In di⁄erent speci￿cations, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and Faria et al (2007) also show that trade
openness is positively associated with the equity share in foreign liabilities.
16Looking at the subcomponents in the changes (repeating Table 4￿ s column (8) across subcomponents)
the positive coe¢ cient for the covariance seems to come from FX
AGG;zero as the change in covariance term
has a positive coe¢ cient in regressions on both NFA and FX
AGG;zero but it is larger and statistically
signi￿cant in the regression on FX
AGG;zero .
20signi￿cant for the equity share in foreign liabilities once country ￿xed e⁄ects are introduced.
The positive time-series association between population growth and FXAGG in column (1)
is shown to operate via both the reserve and non-reserve components of the net foreign
asset position but does not a⁄ect FXAGG;0 or its subcomponents.
With regard to the variables that are not individually signi￿cant in the FXAGG regres-
sion in column (1), several turn out to be signi￿cant in regressions for particular subcompo-
nents. While the pattern of time-series results for trade openness are qualitatively similar
to the pooled estimates, di⁄erent patterns obtain for the capital controls and exchange rate
peg variables. In particular, capital account liberalization is associated with an increase
in the net foreign asset position (the non-reserve component) but an o⁄setting decline in
FXAGG;0, while moving from a ￿ oat to a peg is associated with an increase in FXAGG.
Finally, column (9) in Tables 6 and 7 report the regression results in explaining NETFX.
The NETFX estimates are broadly similar to those for FXAGG but with some exceptions.
In particular, the volatility and covariance terms do not show up as signi￿cant in the pooled
estimates for NETFX, while country size is signi￿cant. Along the time series dimension,
the volatility of GDP and the exchange rate peg measure are individually signi￿cant for
NETFX but were not for FXAGG , while the opposite is true for the covariance term and
nominal exchange rate volatility.
6 Conclusions
Advances in the theoretical modelling of optimal portfolio allocations have enriched our
understanding of the potential risk sharing across countries but also raised questions re-
garding how country portfolios are actually structured. This paper builds on the data set
and analysis in Lane and Shambaugh (2007) to generate new stylized facts regarding the
determinants of the aggregate foreign currency exposure embedded in external positions
and to loosely explore the predictions of this new set of models.
We believe the project generates a number of stylized facts that are both important in
their own right and also of interest to the growing theoretical literature. We highlight that
the net foreign asset position plays a key role in determining aggregate foreign-currency
exposure: looking only at the currency composition of foreign assets and foreign liabilities
misses the fact that the dominant factor for many countries is simply the net balance be-
tween foreign assets and foreign liabilities. Still, composition plays a role but the equity
share in foreign liabilities is quantitatively more important than whether foreign debt lia-
bilities are denominated in domestic currency or foreign currency. Moreover, the pattern
21is that many of those countries that issue domestic-currency foreign debt liabilities are
also signi￿cant holders of domestic-currency foreign assets, such that the net impact on
aggregate foreign currency exposure is limited.
In our pooled regression analysis with year ￿xed e⁄ects, we ￿nd that country character-
istics such as trade openness and GDP per capita are helpful in explaining the cross-country
variation in FXAGG. However, there is considerable unexplained variation along the cross-
sectional dimension, which may help explain why the volatility and covariance measures
suggested in the theoretical literature are either weak or incorrectly signed. Once we elimi-
nate the cross-sectional variation by including country ￿xed e⁄ects, we obtain more support
for the theoretical priors. Most notably, we ￿nd that an increase in the propensity for a cur-
rency to depreciate during bad times is associated with a more positive value for FXAGG,
such that a long position in foreign currencies helps to hedge against domestic output ￿ uc-
tuations. Our ￿nal contribution is to show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the
roles of each regressor in explaining the variation in individual subcomponents of FXAGG.
Accordingly, in assessing hypotheses about the determinants of foreign-currency exposures,
it is important to take a broad perspective rather than examining individual components
in isolation.
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24Table 1: Aggregate Foreign Currency Exposure
1994 2004
mean median mean median
FXagg
All -0.24 -0.26 -0.04 -0.03
Advanced 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.09
Developing & Emerging -0.31 -0.43 -0.08 -0.10
Developing -0.42 -0.47 -0.14 -0.17
Emerging -0.11 -0.07 0.04 0.06
FXDEBTagg
All -0.33 -0.40 -0.14 -0.10
Advanced -0.12 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05
Developing & Emerging -0.39 -0.51 -0.15 -0.20
Developing -0.50 -0.56 -0.22 -0.27
Emerging -0.18 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02
NETFX
All -0.31 -0.22 0.11 -0.04
Advanced 0.17 0.08 0.51 0.36
Developing & Emerging -0.45 -0.36 0 -0.13
Developing -0.73 -0.52 -0.21 -0.22
Emerging 0.06 -0.08 0.38 0.06
Note: FXAGG = !AsA ￿ !LsL; NETFX = FXAGG ￿ IFI. Sample includes the 102
countries with data from 1994 to 2004. Source: Lane and Shambaugh (2007).
25Table 2: Foreign Currency Exposure (FXAGG) and Subcomponents
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Median
FXAGG -0.05 0.27 -0.72 0.68 -0.03
(A ￿ L)=(A + L) -0.28 0.28 -0.87 0.55 -0.30
FXAGG;0 0.23 0.14 -0.03 0.85 0.22
(ANR ￿ L)=(A + L) -0.40 0.26 -0.89 0.15 -0.46
FXR=(A + L) 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.51 0.10
(PEQL + FDIL)=(A + L) 0.24 0.13 0.02 0.85 0.22
DEBTLDC=(A + L) 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.47 0.00
ADC
NR=(A + L) -0.03 0.10 -0.43 0.00 0.00
NETFX 0.08 0.83 -1.57 5.56 -0.05
FXDEBTAGG -0.14 0.30 -0.84 0.72 -0.14
Summary statistics for 2004.
26Table 3: Variance Decomposition of Foreign Currency Exposure: Pooled Analysis
(FXAGG;IFI) (NFA;FXAGG;0) (NFANR;FXR) (EQSHL;DCSHARE) (DCDEBTL;ADC
NR)
ALL (0.56,0.24,0.26) (0.83,0.11,-0.08) (0.91,0.13,0.08) (0.93,0.08,0.03) (0.02,0.15,-0.86)
ADV (0.46,0.53,0.29) (0.66,0.03,-0.43) (0.97,0.03,-0.36) (0.63,0.47,0.10) (0.01,0.29,-0.78)
EMU (0.46,0.62,0.24) (0.40,0.11,-0.52) (0.91,0.11,-0.60) (0.34,0.50,-0.16) (0.01,0.38,-0.74)
NON-EMU (0.46,0.77,0.41) (0.75,0.01,-0.40) (0.99,0.02,-0.25) (0.87,0.52,0.42) (0.34,0.00,-0.77)
EM (0.38,0.80,0.42) (0.86,0.23,0.12) (0.93,0.04,-0.08) (1.00,0.02,0.13) (0.58,0.07,-0.82)
DEV (0.57,0.52,-0.25) (0.77,0.15,-0.11) (0.91,0.63,0.58) (1.00,0.00,-0.03) (1.00,0.00, )
Each cell reports (R2
N1;R2
N2;￿[N1;N2]) where Q = N1+N2 and R2
N1 denotes the R2 from
a regression of Q on N1, R2
N1 denotes the R2 from a regression of Q on N2, and ￿[N1;N2]
is the correlation between N1 and N2. Pooled data over 1994 to 2004.
27Table 4: Determinants of FXAGG: Panel Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
YFE YFE YFE YFE CFE,YFE CFE,YFE ￿ ￿
Trade 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.08
(0.04)** (0.03)* (0.03)* (0.03)* (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
V ol(GDP) -0.92 0.09 0.59 0.60 0.38 0.14 0.31 0.01
(0.87) (0.38) (0.37) (0.36)+ (0.55) (0.56) (0.65) (0.71)
Cov(GDP;E) 2.86 -0.59 -2.37 -2.66 4.89 5.01 7.46 7.44
(1.75) (1.70) (1.50) (1.47)+ (2.85)+ (2.94)+ (3.39)* (3.82)+
V ol(￿) 0.08 -0.27 -0.32 -0.39 0.61 0.38 0.74 0.55
(0.24) (0.23) (0.19)+ (0.19)* (0.33)+ (0.27) (0.40)+ (0.37)
V ol(E) -1.28 0.61 0.89 0.88 -1.52 -1.00 -2.07 -1.53
(0.62)* (0.63) (0.61) (0.57) (0.55)** (0.55)+ (0.62)** (0.64)*
Institutions 0.17 -0.01 -0.002 0.02
(0.03)** (0.05) (0.06) (0.09)
Capital controls -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Peg -0.08 -0.03 0.001 0.03
(0.03)* (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
EMU -0.06 -0.14 -0.12 -0.15
(0.05) (0.03)** (0.04)** (0.04)**
GDP per capita 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.05
(0.01)** (0.02)** (0.10)+ (0.16)
POP 0.03 0.03 0.78 0.73
(0.02) (0.02) (0.22)** (0.28)**
y2000 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.03
(0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.01)** (0.02)
y2004 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.06
(0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.03)
Constant -0.20 -0.25 -1.39 -1.39 -0.22 -3.69 0.14 0.08
(0.06)** (0.06)** (0.11)** (0.20)** (0.05)** (1.07)** (0.02)** (0.05)
Obs. 300 297 300 297 300 297 94 90
R2 0.16 0.43 0.56 0.58 0.92 0.93 0.08 0.26
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. + signi￿cant at 10%; *
signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1% .
28Table 5: Determinants of FXDEBTAGG.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FXAGG FXagg Debt FXAGG FXagg Debt FXAGG FXagg Debt
YFE YFE CFE, YFE CFE, YFE ￿ ￿
Trade 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.10
(0.03)* (0.04)** (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
V ol(GDP) 0.60 0.78 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.35
(0.36)+ (0.51) (0.56) (0.78) (0.71) (1.00)
Cov(GDP;E) -2.66 -2.51 5.01 7.69 7.44 10.23
(1.47)+ (2.10) (2.94)+ (3.75)* (3.82)+ (4.87)*
V ol(￿) -0.39 -0.39 0.38 0.72 0.55 0.97
(0.19)* (0.26) (0.27) (0.36)+ (0.37) (0.50)+
V ol(E) 0.88 0.73 -1.00 -1.52 -1.53 -2.10
(0.57) (0.67) (0.55)+ (0.61)* (0.64)* (0.73)**
Institutions -0.01 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.03
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Capital Controls -0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
PEG -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
EMU -0.14 -0.06 -0.12 -0.10 -0.15 -0.14
(0.03)** (0.05) (0.04)** (0.04)* (0.04)** (0.05)*
GDP per capita 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.20 0.05 0.13
(0.02)** (0.03)** (0.10)+ (0.14) (0.16) (0.21)
POP 0.03 0.02 0.78 0.71 0.73 0.74
(0.02) (0.02) (0.22)** (0.25)** (0.28)** (0.32)*
y2000 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.01
(0.02)** (0.02)** (0.02) (0.03)
y2004 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.06
(0.02)** (0.03)** (0.03) (0.04)
Constant -1.39 -1.52 -3.69 -3.73 0.08 0.07
(0.20)** (0.26)** (1.07)** (1.37)** (0.05) (0.06)
Obs. 297 297 297 297 90 90
R2 0.58 0.4 0.93 0.92 0.26 0.23
Robust standard errors in parentheses. + signi￿cant at 10%; * signi￿cant at 5%; ** signif-
icant at 1% .
29Table 6: Determinants of Subcomponents: Pooled Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FXAGG NFA FXAGG;zero ANR ￿ L FXR EQSHL DCDL DCNRA NETFX
Trade 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.70
(0.03)* (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)* (0.01)** (0.01) (0.27)*
V ol(GDP) 0.60 0.52 0.07 0.44 0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.07 -0.04
(0.36)+ (0.39) (0.18) (0.30) (0.16) (0.18) (0.05) (0.04)+ (1.53)
Cov(GDP;E) -2.66 -3.03 0.38 -3.23 0.20 0.44 -0.54 0.47 -4.69
(1.47)+ (1.87) (1.01) (1.68)+ (0.70) (0.99) (0.27)+ (0.22)* (3.83)
V ol(￿) -0.39 -0.45 0.06 -0.46 0.01 0.07 -0.04 0.03 -0.44
(0.19)* (0.27)+ (0.14) (0.23)+ (0.08) (0.14) (0.03) (0.02) (0.44)
V ol(E) 0.88 0.88 -0.002 0.88 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 1.76
(0.57) (0.81) (0.38) (0.71) (0.18) (0.37) (0.04) (0.04) (1.26)
Institutions -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.003 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.002 0.12
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.12)
Capital controls -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.09
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.10)
Peg -0.03 -0.03 -0.003 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.004)+ (0.003) (0.10)
EMU -0.14 -0.01 -0.13 0.06 -0.07 -0.06 0.18 -0.25 -0.42
(0.03)** (0.04) (0.05)** (0.04) (0.02)** (0.03)+ (0.02)** (0.03)** (0.19)*
GDP per capita 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.13 -0.001 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.20
(0.02)** (0.02)** (0.01) (0.02)** (0.01) (0.01) (0.003)* (0.003)* (0.06)**
POP 0.03 0.02 0.003 0.03 -0.002 0.003 0.01 -0.01 0.12
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)+ (0.01) (0.01) (0.004)* (0.003)** (0.04)**
y2000 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.14
(0.02)** (0.02)* (0.01)** (0.01) (0.01)+ (0.01)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.04)**
y2004 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 -0.001 0.01 0.24
(0.02)** (0.02)** (0.01)** (0.02)* (0.01)** (0.01)** (0.003) (0.003)* (0.06)**
Constant -1.39 -1.45 0.06 -1.54 0.09 0.06 -0.04 0.05 -2.63
(0.20)** (0.23)** (0.09) (0.18)** (0.09) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02)* (0.61)**
Obs. 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
R2 0.58 0.48 0.17 0.62 0.13 0.17 0.76 0.86 0.55
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. + signi￿cant at 10%; *
signi￿cant at 5%; ** signi￿cant at 1% .
30Table 7: Determinants of Subcomponents: Fixed-E⁄ects Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
FXAGG NFA FXAGG;zero ANR ￿ L FXR EQSHL DCDL DCNRA NETFX
Trade 0.04 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.34
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)* (0.01)* (0.01) (0.44)
V ol(GDP) 0.14 0.001 0.13 0.20 -0.19 0.10 0.04 -0.01 2.67
(0.56) (0.60) (0.26) (0.50) (0.33) (0.27) (0.05) (0.03) (1.40)+
Cov(GDP;E) 5.01 2.60 2.39 0.98 1.62 1.89 0.41 0.09 7.02
(2.94)+ (2.69) (1.54) (2.19) (1.13) (1.54) (0.52) (0.19) (8.74)
V ol(￿) 0.38 0.62 -0.24 0.32 0.30 -0.32 0.06 0.01 0.99
(0.27) (0.28)* (0.17) (0.21) (0.11)** (0.16)* (0.04) (0.02) (0.91)
V ol(E) -1.00 -0.37 -0.63 -0.13 -0.24 -0.51 -0.08 -0.05 -0.95
(0.55)+ (0.46) (0.25)* (0.33) (0.21) (0.24)* (0.06) (0.03) (1.21)
Institutions 0.006 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.002 0.001 0.01 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.09)
Capital controls 0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.001 0.03
(0.03) (0.03)* (0.02)* (0.03)* (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.002) (0.06)
Peg 0.001 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.001 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.13
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)+ (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06)*
EMU -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.15 -0.22 -0.19
(0.04)** (0.03) (0.04)* (0.03) (0.01)** (0.02) (0.02)** (0.02)** (0.12)
GDP per capita 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.06
(0.10)+ (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.01)* (0.02) (0.23)
POP 0.78 0.82 -0.04 0.52 0.29 0.03 -0.06 -0.003 0.97
(0.22)** (0.23)** (0.17) (0.21)* (0.09)** (0.16) (0.04) (0.04) (0.51)+
y2000 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.002 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.09
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)+ (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)+ (0.004) (0.004) (0.05)+
y2004 0.06 0.003 0.05 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.001 0.18
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)* (0.01) (0.09)+
Constant -3.69 -3.70 0.01 -2.69 -1.01 -0.49 0.44 0.06 -3.69
(1.07)** (1.23)** (1.19) (1.05)* (0.55)+ (1.07) (0.20)* (0.27) (2.67)
Obs. 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
R2 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.97 0.94
Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. + signi￿cant at 10%; *






























































































































































































Figure 6: Scatter of Partial Relation between ￿COV (GDP;NEER) and ￿FXAGG.
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